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References  39IMPACT  OF  INVESTMENT POLICIES  ON  GERMAN  DIRECT  INVESTMENT
IN  DEVELOPING  COUNTRIES:  AN  EMPIRICAL  INVESTIGATION
Andrea  Gubitz*
I. Introduction
Over  the  last  few  years  foreign  direct  investment  (FDI)  has  become  the  most
important  single  private  source  of financing  flows  to  developing  countries.  In
1988  it  accounted  for  almost  58  percent  of total  private  and  18 1/2  percent  of
total  resource  flows  to  developing  countries.  This  is  partly  due  to  the  fact  that
international  bank lending  practically  came to a halt and partly due to an
upswing  of FDI in  developing  countries  since  1986,  in many cases  supported  by
debt/equity  swap  programs.  FDI  in the industrialized  world,  however,  has grown
much  faster  leaving  the  developing  countries  with  a  declining  share  of the  cake.
It is  thus  of  obvious  interest  for  researchers  and  for  policy  makers  alike,  what
the  determinants  of FDI  in developing  countries  are,  especially  the  effects  of
policy  measures,  in order  to find out, how the  potential  interest  of foreign
investors  can  be stabilized  and  enhanced.
For the  developing  countries,  however,  the  main  benefit  of FDI is  not so
much the  substitution  for  private  lending,  but  the  improvement  of technological
and  managerial  standards,  the  increase  in  labor  productivity  and  a  bet:er  access
to export  markets.  Another  advantage  is that  capital  costs  are  closely  geared
to the  profitability  of the  capital  stock,  i.e.  no  contractual  interest  payments
are involved.  However  there  is a price to pay: earnings  on direct  investment
'This  paper  was  written  while  the  author  was  a  consultant  at the  World  Bank.
It was presented at the seventh  conference  of the European  Association  for
Research  in  Industrial  Economics  held  in  Lisbon  in  September  of  1990. It  is  part
of a  project on the determinants  of German foreign direct investment in
developing  countries  in  cooperation  with  the  Kiel  Institute  for  World  Economics.
For  stimulating  discussions,  I  am grateful  to  Asli Demirguc-Kunt,  J.P.  Agarwal
and  Peter  Nunnenkamp.  Many  thanks  also  to  the  Deutsche  Bundesbank  and  the  German
ministry of Economic  Affairs for making available  data without which this
research  could  not  have  been  undertaken.2
capital are estimated  to be higher than returns  on loans (see IMF (1985)).
Nevertheless,  on the  whole  FDI  is  considered  advantageous  for  the  host  countries
and to  be crucial  in the  process  of development.
Apart  from  a  favorable  economic  performance,  which  generally  attracts  investment,
host  countries'  regulations  and  policies  with  respect  to  foreign  investment  have
been  pinpointed  to  be  a  major  determinant  of  the  amount  of  FDI  a  country  actually
receives. In contrast to host countries'  policies the issue of the source
countries'  policies  to  increase  FDI  in  developing  countries  is  less  well  covered.
This miglht  be due to the fact that the positive  effects are less obvious.
Improving  the  investment  climate  in  the  host  countries  is  in  many  cases  a  matter
of liberalizing  a rather  restricted  market,  thus  removing  distorting  incentives
by allowing  more  competition.  Extending  the  measures  of the  source  countries  to
enhance  FDI  in  developing  countries  is,  however,  mostly  a  matter  of introducing
non-market  incentives  in  form  of  subsidies.  This  is  justified  only,  if  additional
FDI is induced.  The  main purpose  of the  paper  is therefore  to partly  fill this
gap  by investigating  both the  effects  of  host  and  source  countries'  measures  to
stimulate FDI inflows  to developing  countries  for the case of the Federal
Republic  of Germany.
Germany  is  one  of the  major  suppliers  of FDI  funds  to the  world;  according
to  the  balance  of  payments  statistics  of  the  IMF  it  ranks  fourth  after  the  United
States,  Japan and  United  Kingdom  with a share  of roughly  ten  percent  of total
world FDI  outflows.  Also it turned  into  a net  creditor  relatively  recently.  In
1976 foreign  FDI stocks  in Germany exceeded  German  FDI stock abroad (DM 48
billion)  by DM 31  billion.  By the  end  of 1988,  however,  German  FDI  stocks  abroad
amounted  to  DM 184  billion  exceeding  foreign  stocks  in  Germany  by  DM 75  billion.
The interest  of  German  companies  to  invest  abroad  is  heavily  concentrated  in  the3
industrialized  world and the  trend  is rising.  While in 1976 20 percent  of the
total  stock  was invested  in developing  countries,  almost  half of it in Brazil
alone,  this  share  dropped  to  12  percent  by the  end  of 1988.  Though  this  pattern
resembles  the  one  of  other  industrialized  countries,  it  is  relatively  pronounced
in the  German  case.
The  reason  for  this  behavior  can  be  explained  by  looking  at  FDI  in  relation
to other  international  activities  of German  investors.  Although  FDI, i.e. the
acquisition  of  production  facilities  abroad,  either  new  ones  or  more  frequently
- existing  ones, is gaining  importance  within the long run structure  of the
balance  of payments  and  with respect  to domestic  investment,  foreign  trade  is
still by far the most important  activity  in international  business.  Annual
merchandise  exports  are roughly  three  times  as high as FDI  stocks.  For  most of
the  companies  exports  are the  first  step into  international  business,  followed
by licensing  and direct investment.  Often licensing  is seen as a suboptimal
solution  for  production  in  a  foreign  country  because  of  perceived  high  monitoring
costs;  thus  companies  frequently  prefer  to  become  a direct  investor  immediately
after they have established  a market  share  through  trade.  In the  German  case
licensing  is negligible.  The close link  between  exports  and FDI explains  the
regional  pattern  of  German  FDI,  especially  so  the  increasing  concentration  within
the  EC and the  United  States.
With respect  to developing  countries,  however,  this linkage  is not as
strict.  Brazil,  for  example,  hosts  5 1/2  percent  of total  German  FDI  stocks  but
exports to Brazil are only 1/2 percent of total German exports. Brazil's
investment  and  trade  policy  together  with  its  market  size  had  strongly  supported
FDI  as a substitute  for  imports  in  the  past.  On the  other  hand India  hosts  only
about  1/4  percent  of total  German  FDI  despite  its  market  size,  but imports  about4
0.6 percent  of total  German  exports.  This is a results  of its traditionally
restrictive  stance  with  respect  to  foreign  investors.  The  two  examples  illustrate
that host countries'  policies  can disguise  the underlying  economic factors
explaining  FDI.  On the  other  hand  there  are  countries  where  German  FDI  stock  is
unusually  high and  probably  almost  completely  covered  by public  guarantees  of
the German federal  government  (for example  Egypt).  Thus the availability  of
supportive  measures in the source countries  potentially  increases  FDI in a
developing  country  by driving  a wedge  between  the generally  perceived  country
risk and the risk of the foreign direct  investors  of the particular  source
country.
Both  issues will be  addressed in this paper. The major  investment
regulations  in the  host  countries  and  their  effects  on German  FDI inflows  will
be discussed  in the next section  followed  by an analysis  of a major source
country's  policy  measure,  namely  public  guarantees  (section  III).  The results
are  summarized  in a concluding  section.
II.  The Effect  of Host  Countries'  Policy  Measures  on FDI  Inflows  from  Germany
Whatever  the  economic  determinants  of  FDI  in  the  developing  countries  are,
their empirical  investigation  will be partially  disguised  by the rules and
regulations  governing  the  inflow  of  direct  capital  into  the  developing  countries.
The purpose  of this section  is twofold:  first  to give  an overview  of the  most
important  aspects  of investment  legislation  and  policy  in  the  host  countries  and
second  to develop  and test indicators  for the degree  of openness  of the  host
countries.  The first issue has been covered thoroughly  in various studies;
examples  are  Becsky,  Lee  and  Ordu  (1989),  Rosenn  (1989)  and  IMF  (1985).  Thus  only
those  factors  of particular  interest  for the further  investigation  will be5
raised here. Apart from special studies  the IMF and the U.N. Committee  on
Transnational  Corporations  (UNCTC)  supply  regular  information  on this  topic.  A
synopsis  of selected  aspects  of host countries'  investment  policies  for  major
recipients  of German  FDI is given  in the  appendix.
As the major aim of this study is a quantitative  assessment  of  the
determinants  of FDI, the qualitative  information  has to somehow  be quantified
in  order  to  fit  into  the  regression  analysis.  For  this  purpose  it is translated
into  an indicator  which  describes  the  degree  of openness  of a country. 2 It can
be argued  that this  procedure  is rather  arbitrary.  Moreover,  as the  available
indicators  rely  or.  "expert  knowledge",  they  ara  likely  to  have some  common  bias.
These  problems  can  be  partly  overcome  by  developing  an  owrn  assessment  and  compare
it to other  indicators.
II.1  Obstacles  to FDI - Some  Major  Issues
The regulations  and  policies  of  the  developing  countries  to  influence  the
inflow  of  foreign  capital  can  be  quite  complex  and  are  often  rather  inconsistent.
When  relating  the actual  size of German  FDI  stock  in a single  country  to the
country's  regulatory  framework  one  has to keep in  mind that in most cases  the
FDI  stock  is  the  result  of  decisions  of  very  few  companies  (sometimes  only  one),
for  which  a  particular  component  of  the  regulatory  framework  might  have  - at  that
particular  point in time - outweighed  all the others.  On an aggregate  level
however there are a few components  of the rules and regulations  that are
generally  considered  to be crucial.
2It  should  be  mentioned  that  measurements  of  the  investment  climate  are  more
readily  available.  They include ,  however,  economic  performance  and stability
aspects.  The  focus  here is  narrower,  i.e.  restricted  to institutional  rules  and
habits.6
A major if not the  most serious  obstacle  to FDI is the restriction  on
ownership,.  German  compan'es  have  a  strong  preference  for  100  percent  ownership.
The reasoning  for this is similar  to the one for the preference  for direct
investment  over  licensing  (see  Buckley  and  Casson  (1985)).  It  eases  the  decision
process  inside  the  company  and  allows  for  better  control  over intangible  assets
such as technology,  product  quality  and credibility.  It has to be mentioned,
however, that joint ventures  have their particular  advantages  too. Country
specific  aspects  of  production  and  distribution  can  be more  easily  handled  with
a  local partner sharing the risk burden. Especially  small and medium-size
companies  appreciate  these  advantages  of joint  ventures.
According  to a study  of the HWWA-Institute  companies  own on average  84
percent  of  their  affiliates  abroad;  in  Latin  America  the  percentage  share  is  even
higher  (87.3  percent),  whereas  in  Asia,  where  ownership  restrictions  used to  be
particularly  high in the  past, it is significantly  lower  (56.3%,  see Scharrer
and Kragenau  (1988)).  Companies  are generally  more restricted  with respect  to
their  control  of ownership  in developing  than  in industrialized  countries.
Some countries  have codified  limits  varying from sector  to sector  with
complete  foreign  ownership  being  the  exception,  often  approved  particularly  to
export-orientated  companies  (for  example  in Malaysia).  Other countries  decide
on  a  discretionary  basis  (like  Thailand),  and  many  countries'  regulation  requires
a gradual  increase  in national  participation  (for  example  Peru).  An important
qualification  to the  above  described  regional  pattern  of shares  has  however  to
be made: most developing  countries,  especially  so in Asia, liberalized  their
investment  policies  substantially.  In  particular  possibilities  for  fully  foreign
owned  investment  projects  were  extended.  The  most  important  holder  of  German  FDI,
Brazil,  however,  is following  a  more  restrictive  stance,  at least  in  comparison7
to other  countries.
Another  important  factor  influencing  the  investment  climate  of  a  developing
country  concerns  restrictiaons  n the  repatriatlon  of profits  and  PaRital.  This
issue  also involves  the  access  to foreign  exchange  (for  details  see IMF).  Even
if the  repatriation  of profits  and  capital  is granted  under  the  investment  code
of the  country  or by a  bilateral  investment  treaty,  this  is  not  of  much  use, if
access  to  foreign  exchange  is  restricted.  This  is  especially  true  for  companies
which mainly  operate in the domestic  market.  Most countries  with severe  debt
problems  restrict  repatriation  of  profits  and  capital.  In  Argentina  for  example
an  emergency legislation  used to prohibit the repatriation  of capital,  and
capital  acquired  under  the  debt/equity  conversion  program  cannot  be repatriated
for  ten  years.  Other  countries,  for  example  Kenya,  restrict  the  repatriation  of
capital  gains.
Although  no  country  completely  prohibits  the  repatriation  of  profits,  many
countries  have  certain  restrictions,  which  distort  optimal  financing  conditions.
Many countries  restrict  the  repatriation  of profits  to a certain  percentage  of
the  registered  capital.  Earnings  repatriated  above  that  amount  are  highly  taxed.
Brazil  for example  restricts  the  repatriation  of profits  to 12 percent  of the
registered  capital  (in  foreign  currency)  calculated  over a three  year  average.
Although  this  regulation  might  appear  harmless  at first  sight,  it  turns  out to
be  a  major  flaw,  because  registered  capital  is  usually  not  allowed  to  be  adjusted
for inflation;  as a lot  of FDI stock  is registered  a long  time ago  often  only
a  sm.ll  proportion  of the  actual  profit  can  be  remitted.  This  gives  an  additional
strong incentive  to invest  in form of a loan rather than in form of equity
capital,  because  remittance  of interest  earnings  on foreign  loans  is geared  to
market  ratBs (for  details  see  Rosenn  (1989)).8
According  to a survey  on German  firms'  investment  behavior  in  developing
countries  done by the Ifo-Insti.tute  in Munich dating  back to 1980 "the most
important  individual  factor  for  German  investors  is  the  difficulties  in  dealing
with  the  state  authorities  (bureaucracy)  in  devc  oping  countries.  Only  just  under
one-fifth  of tha  ratings  classitied  this  as a  minor  factor  (  Pollak  and  Riedel
(1984,  p. 29))."  Obtaining  a  complete  picture  of  this  issue  for  all  the  countries
included  in the investigation  is,  of course,  beyond  the scope  of this  paper.
There are countries  which are known to have a particular  tedious  approval
proceduge,  for example  Nigeria  and Kenya.  On the other hand there  are a few
countries  which  have  a  codified,  straightforward  approval  process;  in  Korea  for
example  many investment  projects  are  approved  automatically.  For  the  purpose  of
this investigation  the scoring  of the  approval  process  is in most cases taken
from  outside  sources.
Apart from  the three  issues  discussed  above  there  are many others  which
are  crucial  for  the  investment  climate  in  a developing  country.  Countries  which
are restrictive  with respective  to the above mentioned factors often have
numerous  exceptions  from their  rules for specific  purposes.  Among those  are
export  processing  zones,  tax  exemptions,  and  high  degree  of  industry  protection.
Other  countries,  like  Chile  and  recently  Korea,  rather  rely  more  on deregulation
for  foreign  and  domestic  investors  alike.  With  respect  to  the  various  exemptions
from taxes, tariffs and duties particular  preferential  treatment is often
available  for joint  ventures  (Algeria,  Egypt,  Mexico).  There  are on the  other
hand some popular disincentives  like quotas mandating employment  of host
country's  -- tionals (Malaysia)  and  performance  requirements  like  local  content
requirements  (Venezuela).  The pattern  of incentives  and disincentives  often
varies  substantially  between  different  sectors.9
11.2  Measuring.  the_DpXee_LfO_tns
Measurements  on  the  restrictiveness  of  investment  regulations  of  developing
countries  take the  above  mentioned  issues  into  account.  However,  the  perception
of this restrictiveness  varies  from source  country  to source  country.  This is
due  to  traditional  and/or  cultural  links  as  well  as  to  political  factors.  Germany
never  had colonies  on a large  scale  and thus little  particular  cultural  links
to the  developing  world.  It  has  on the  other  hand  a strong  competitive  position
in  the  classical  sectors  of  manufacturing  (for  example  chemistry)  and  thus  might
find it easier to operate in some developing  countries than would other
industrialized  countries.  Furthermore,  Germany  has  a large  number  of bilateral
investments  treaties  (63)  and  double  taxation  agreements  (33)  (see  BMZ).  In  order
to measure  the  degree  of openness  for  German  FDI these  factors  should  be taken
into  account.
For the purpose of this study the degree  of openness (OP) has to be
quantified  in order to be introduced  in the regression  analysis.  This is of
course  a rather  subjective  task.  One way to approach  it is to summarize  the
information  given in the  synopsis  in the  appendix  and classify  countries  into
very restrictive  ( - 1 ),  restrictive  (  - 2 ), semi-open  ( - 3 ),  and  open ( 
4 )  on the  basis  of the  researcher's  own  judgement.  Although  no  weighting  index
was  quantified,  the  criteria  of  Part  I  of  Annex  II  counted  (in  general)  more  than
those of Part II, especially  for "lender and ownership"  restrictions.  The
approval  process,  although  a  very important  criterion,  is  difficult  to measure
and was thus taken into account only in obvious  cases.  As it is often a
composite  of many rather  harmless  measures  that form  a severe  restriction,  no
methodical  procedure  was applied in classifying  countries  according to the10
information  given  in Annex  II.  Another  way of dealing  with this  problem  is to
rely on the  compilation  and  evaluation  of information  which  other  institutions
collected.  Two sources  are available:
(1)  A measurement  conducted  by Frost  &  Sullivan,  Inc. for the United States
Ager.cy  of International  Development  in 1988  based on their own research  and
expert  knowledge  (see  Frost  & Sullivan  (1988)).
(2)  A measurement  conducted  by the Ifo-Institute  in Munich in 1980 based on
several  sources  of  expert  knowledge  from  German  institutions  dealing  with  foreign
affairs  (  see  Osterkamp  (1983)).
The  advantage  of relying  on own  judgement  is  that  the  researcher  is  aware
of the  limits  of the  resulting  n-lassification,  which  is  in  this  case  purely  based
on  published information.  Furthermore,  certain bilateral aspects, such as
investment  treaties  and  double  taxation  agreements,  are explicitly  taken  into
account.
Aspects  of political  and  economic  stability,  however,  are explicitly  not
taken  into  account.  The  disadvantage  of this  option  is that the  measurement  is
less  comprehensive,  as the  list  of sources  is  limited  and incomplete.  This  flaw
can  be avoided  by relying  on  the  measurement  of  other  institutions,  which  collect
information  from  various  country  experts.  There  are,  however  two shortcomings
to this  approach  as well.  First,  the  quality  of the index  has to be taken  for
granted,  and second,  the indices  available  do not strictly  measure  the  degree
of  openness,  but  the  investment  climate,  i.e.  they  take  into  account  factors  that
are  not strictly  regulatory.11
Table  11.2:  Country  Classification:  Degree  of Openness
Researcher's  Average  Score:
Developing  Judgement  score  1-9,  Ifo-Inst.
Country  FS  *)
2=
Algeria  restrictive  3.0  NA
Indonesia  semi-open  2.9  36.68
Iran  very restrictive  NA  NA
Libya  very restrictive  2.1  NA
Nigeria  restrictive  2.3  33.5
Venezuela  restrictive  2.4  34.67
Un.Ar.  Emirates  open  NA  39.0
Africa
Cote  d'Ivoire  open  3.6  41.5
Egypt  semi-open  3.4  33.67
Kenya  restrictive  2.8  37.67
Morocco  semi-open  3.4  42.0
Tunisia  open  4.0  44.0
America
Argentina  restrictive  2.8  38.0
Brazil  semi-open  2.4  42.5
Chile  open  3.7  NA
Colombia  open  3.8  37.0
Guatemala  restrictive  2.8  NA
Mexico  semi-open  3.0  37.33
Peru  very restrictive  2.3  36.0
Hong  Kong  open  4.7  50.0
India  restrictive  2.6  36.0
Israel  open  4.0  NA
Korea  open  3.6  31.5
Malaysia  semi-open  3.4  37.67
Pakistan  open  3.4  36.0
Philippines  semi-open  4.2  37.5
Singapore  open  4.7  48.5
Sri Lanka  open  3.9  NA
Syria  very restrictive  2.3  NA
Thailand  open  3.9  38.0
Turkey  open  3.6  NA
*) Frost  & Sullivan  (1988);  - **) see  Osterkamp  (1983).
NA:  not  available.12
The index constructed  by Frost & Sullivan,  Inc. (FS) is based on 14
different  criteria.  For  each  country  (the  total  number  of countries  covered  is
95)  a  score  ranging  from  one  (worst  case)  to  five (best  case)  is given  for  each
criterion.  For  the  purpose  of this  study  the  five  "non-institutional"  criteria
have  been excluded.  This  index  is  thus  the  unweighted  average  of nine  criteria:
controls on ownership,  approval  process, dispute settlement,  employment  of
nationals,  exchange  controls,  repatriation  restrictions,  investment  incentives,
and tax  rates.  Another  advantage  of the  FS-index  is that it is fairly  recent.
It is, however,  uncontrollable,  in how far the scoring  of one criterium  is
influenced  by the  scoring  of others  including  those  which  are  excluded  for  the
purpose  of this  study.
The index  constructed  by the Ifo-Institute  (IFO)  is  based  on 17  criteria
for 36 countries,  which cover mainly regulations,  but also the aspects of
political  stability.  Information  was collected  by sending  questionnaires  to
country  experts  in different  institutions  located  in  Germany (for  example  the
GTZ 3) and  abroad  (for  example  embassies).  For  each  criterion  experts  were  asked
to give a score  ranging  from  one  for  "very  restrictive"  over two  for "somewhat
restrictive"  to  three  for  "little  restrictive".  The  index  itself  is  an  unweighted
sum of the scores, i.e. the maximum  value attainable  is 51. The Ifo-Index
implicitly  takes  into account  German  aspects  of the  investment  environment  in
a developing  country.  Its  main flaw is that it is somewhat  outdated.  For this
index in particular  it is uncontrollable  in how far answers  to the different
criteria  were  influenced  by each  other  and  by  outside  factors  such  as  the  general
3Gesellschaft  fur  Technische  Zusammenarbeit.  The  GTZ is  a company  owned  by
the government  that  advises  on and conducts  projects  in developing  countries.
Their  services  are  usually  free  of charge  for  the  developing  country.13
economic  performance  of a country.
Table  II.2  lists  the  classification  of selected  countries  with respect  to
the three  different  indicators  discussed  above. There  are a few  deviations  in
the  classification  of  a  country  depending  on  which  indicator  is  used.  Two  of  them
are  worth  mentioning.  The  degree  of openness  for  Brazil  is  judged  to  be low  by
FS and  high  by IFO.  This  is  mostly  due  to  a  national  bias  of the  two  indicators.
The sectorial  structure  of German FDI makes it easier  to fit into Brazil's
investment  regulations.  Thus  German  experts  judge  Brazil  to be more open than
American  experts.  Another  reason  for  the  deviation  is that  the  FS-index  is far
more recent,  thus taking  into  account  Brazil's  rather  restrictive  Informatics
Law.  Last  but  not  least,  Brazil  did  not  change  much  with  respect  to  its  openness,
but  other  major  recipients  did,  leaving  Brazil  with  a  relatively  worse  image  in
recent  years.  Another  major  deviation  occurs  with respect  to Korea.  The much
higher  scoring  with  respect  to  the  FS-index  is  due  to the  fact  that  Korea  became
more open in recent  years,  especially  so in 1988.
II.3 Influence  of the  Degree  of Openness  on German  FDI  Outflows  to Developing
Countries
The  discussion  on  measuring  the  degree  of openness  revealed  that  an index
observed  over time  would  be ideal  to  explain  FDI  inflows.  On the  other  hand the
perception  of the  investment  policy  of a country  probably  changes  only slowly.
Thus it  is  quite  justified  to  use  a constant  indicator  to  pick  up the  influence
of  host  countries'  policies  on their  FDI  inflows  from  Germany.  In  order  to find
out whether the degree of openness  is a significant  determinant  of FDI and
whether  the  above  described  indicators  behave  differently  we need  a regression
4The  countries  are  major  holders  of German  FDI  stocks.14
equation  specified  well enough  to lead to unbiased  estimators  of its coeffi-
cients.  The specification  chosen  here draws  on results  of a thorough  study  of
German  FDI in developing  countries  by Agarwal,  Gubitz  and Nunnenkamp  (1990).
There  it is found  that  German  FDI  is  strongly  market  oriented  not  only in  terms
of market  size as  measured  by the  GNP  of the  respective  host country,  but also
in terms  of market  penetration  of German  exports  product  in the  host country's
market,  while  the  influence  of  other  factors  like  real  growth  rates,  labor  costs,
etc.  were not  unambiguously  supported.5
In order to test the significance  of the influence  of host countries
investment  policies  on German  FDI as many flow data to single countries  as
possible  should  be taken into account  in order to reduce the possibility  of
selection  bias. The dependent  variable  should  ideally  be split up into real
values and  a  deflator in order to investigate  volume and price effects
separately.  FDI  data,  however,  is  always  compiled  in  nominal  terms,  in  this  case
in  currency  of the  source  country,  i.e. in  D-mark.  Therefore  one  could  deflate
the  nominal  values  by  a suitable  domestic  deflator,  for  example  the  German  price
index  for  investment  goods.  This  leads  to  an unbiased  series  for  real  FDI  values
under  two  assumptions:  first,  purchasing  power  parity  (PPP)  is  fulfilled  for  the
exchange  rate of the  host country's  currency  vis-a-vis  the  D-mark,  and second
the  price  index  ch.osen  is a good  proxy  for  the  true  unit  value  of FDI  transac-
tions.  Both assumptions  are,  however,  highly  questionable.  The real exchange
rates fluctuated  widely in the sample  period  and deflating  a financial  flow
variable  that is generated  by a set  of rather  heterogenous  transactions  would
5In  the  above  mentioned  study  it  was  found  that  present  and  past  penetration
of German  export  products  has  a positive  impact  on German  FDI,  but  present  and
past FDI  has no significant  impact  on German  exports  to developing  countries.
Thus neither  a substitution  effect  as implied  by the theory  of optimal  timing
of a FDI  nor a growth  effect  could  be detected.15
be quite a complex  task.  Therefore  the analysis  is based on data in nominal
terms. Furthermore,  as new  investments  and liquidations  are likely to be
influenced  quite  differently  by the investment  policy  of a country  gross  flow
data  would  be desirable.  However,  all these  data  requirements  cannot  be met in
practice.  (Properly  deflated  data  would  have  been preferable,  of course.)
The  most  broadly  based  regional  as  well  as sectoral  data set  is  the  stock
statistic,  which  covers  time  series  for  about  70  countries  for  the  period  1976
to 1987 (source:  Deutsche  Bundesbank).  The countries  covered  are  either  major
holders  or holders  of several  small  amounts  of German  FDI. If a country  is  not
listed  or its  numbers  are  not  shown,  it  can,  however,  not  be concluded  that  its
German FDI stock is close to zero; it is rather a holder of one or two
investments  that  are  not shown  due to  confidentiality.
The  valuation  problem  raised  above  gets  even  worse  when  "net  outflows"  are
calculated  from an increase  in stocks  of  primary  and secondary  FDI, because
capital  gains  and  losses  due to  valuation  changes  and  exchange  rate  variations
are  included.  Valuation  changes  due  to  exchange  rate  movements  are  a  particularly
severe  problem in German  data.  The stock values  are usually  historical  book
values  converted  into  German  mark  at the  end of each  year.  Thus converting  the
stocks  into the  currency  of the  host country  at end-of-period  exchange  rates,
taking  first  differences  and converting  those  back to German  mark at average-
of-period  exchange  rates  should  lead  to  a  better  approximation  to the  flow  data
of the  balance  of  payments.  Indeed  the  correlation  between  the  increase  in  stocks
and  flows  is  higher  when the  increase  in  stocks  is  measured  in  the  way  described
above.  There  are,  however,  a few  major  recipient  countries  for  which  the above
described  adjustment  is false,  namely  those  which suffer  from high inflation
rates.  In those  countries  book  values  are  usually  adjusted  for  inflation.  Thus16
the  first  differences  of the  stock  values  in  local  currency  as  well  as in  German
mark at average-of-period  exchange  rates  exaggerate  the  historical  transaction
values.
In the following  regression  analysis  first  differences  of the  original
stock data were used as a proxy for net outflows.  As the high inflation
countries  of Latin  America  have a particularly  high weight  in  German  FDI, the
respective  end-of-period  exchange  rates  were  included  in  the  regression  equation
in order  to capture  valuation  effects.
6 The data set covers  41 countries  and
eleven  years  (1977  to  1987).  The  only  index  for  the  degree  of  openness  available
covering  all  the  41  countries  is  the  FS-index.  The  resulting  regression  equation
is:
7
(II.1)  DLXDMST  - 128.9  - 0.08*LXDMST(-1)  - 0.22*DLEXDM  - 0.01*LEXDM(-l)
(3.1)  (2.6)  (4.2)  (1.3)
+  O.08*LGDM  +  O.04*LEXAN  +  1.92*FS, Rsquared  - 0.11,  NOB: 451
(3.2)  (1.9)  (0.8)  Chisquared  - 77.9 (critical
value:  33.9)
Although  changes in FDI stock are measured  at an aggregate  level the
numbers  often  reflect  the  behavior  of only  a few  investors.  Thus  heteroscedas-
ticity  is  a  potential  problem,  not  only  with  respect  to  the  different  countries,
6Cross  rates  derived  from  market  rates  vis-a-vis  the  US-Dollar  as  published
by the IMF  were  used.  When valuation  effects  due to exchange  rate changes  are
properly  taken  into  account,  the  regression  results  obtained  from  other  adjusted
for the "end-of-period  effect" deviate very little from those using first
differences  of the  original  stock  data.
7LX:-  log(X),  DLX:-  log(X)  - log(X(-l)),  XDMST:  German  FDI  stock  in  German
mark, EXDM: local  currency  per German  mark, GDM: GNP of the  host country in
German mark, EXAN: German  exports to the host country relative  to the host
country's  GNP, FS:  FS-index;  adjusted  t-values  in  brackets;  Chisquared:  White-
test  on  homoscedasticity.-  Data sources:  see  Annex  I17
but  also  over  time.  Therefore  the  null  of  homoscedasticity  of the  error  term  had
to be  tested.  The null was rejected  for equation (1). Therefore corrected
standard  errors  of  the  estimated  coefficients  were  used  to  calculate  the  t-values
given  in  brackets. 8 The  OLS  estimators  of the  coefficients  are  still  consistent,
but  not  most efficient  any  more.
The  overall  explanatory  power  of  the  equation  is  rather  weak;  at  least  the
lagged  stock  variable  is significantly  less than  zero.  The coefficient  of the
rate  of change  of the  exchange  rate indicates  strong  valuation  effects  and  the
market  orientation  of  German  FDI  is  confirmed.  The  coefficient  of the  degree  of
openness  turned  out  to  be insignificant.  There  are  various  possible  reasons  for
this outcome:  First, the degree  of openness  might in fact be irrelevant  for
investment  decisions  (if  FDI is import-substituting,  for example);  second  the
measurement  of the  FDI  outflow  by changes  in  stocks  maybe  inappropriate;  third,
the omission  of other  explanatory  variables  may lead to  biased  estimates,  and
fourth,  the  FS-index  might  be unsuitable  to  measure  the  degree  of openness.
Thus  one  way  to  further  investigate  this  issue  is  to  improve  the  data  base.
There  is,  however,  a  price  to  pay:  the  number  of countries  for  which  be:ter  data
is available,  decreases  to 18 leaving  us with a potentially  higher  selection
bias. 9
Let  us start  on the last issue  raised  above.  Estimating  equation  (1)  in
a subsample  for  the  stock  data  set  and  varying  the  indicator  for the  degree  of
openness  does not lead to any further insight.  The results actually  become
8For  testing  for  homoscedasticity  and  correcting  of  the  standard  errors  see
White (1980).
9These  countries  are  Argentina,  Brazil,  Colombia,  C6te  d'Ivoire,  Egypt,  Hong
Kong,  India,  Indonesia,  Korea  (South),  Malaysia,  Mexico,  Morocco,  Nigeria,  Peru,
Singapore,  Thailand,  Tunisia,  and the  United  Arab Emirates.18
implausible  when using the index based on FS and on the researcher's  own
judgement.
As argued  above  what is really  influenced  by the  degree  of openness  are
new investments  in the developing  countries. 10 This transaction  data is less
distorted  by valuation  changes  of the  book  values,  it  does  not,  however,  contain
secondary  FDI.  The  regression  results  based  on transaction  values  for  the  period
of 1977  to 1988  are  summarized  in table  II.3  below.  The lag-endogenous  variable
is added  to capture  some  dynamic  behavior." 1
100n  a bilateral  basis this data is published  only for outflows  to the
United  States.  However,  for  a selection  of developing  countries  this data  was
kindly  made available  by the  Deutsche  Bundesbank.
" 1As  the  sample  contains  only  12  years  for  each  country  a  more  sophisticated
dynamic  approach  is inapplicable.  Note  that  equation  (1)  has the  form  of an ECM
approach (although  rudimentary)  while the equations of table IV.3 are of
autoregressive  form.  As  the  dependent  variable  contains  zero  observations  a  small
constant  was added  before  taking  logs.19
Table II.3: Regressions of Gross FDI Outflows (FDM) to Developing Countries
Degree
LFDM(-1)  DLEXDM  LEXDM(-l)  LGDM  of  RSQ  CHISQ*)
Openness
FS:**  0.74  0.14  -0.03  0.02  10.89  0.94  36.5
(18.2)  (0.7)  (1.9)  (2.2)  (1.5)
OP:**  0.73  0.15  -0.03  0.02  11.70  0.94.  28.6
(17.9)  (0.8)  (2.0)  (2.4)  (1.5)
IFO:**  0.74  0.05  -0.02  0.04  0.03  0.94  24.9
(18.6)  (0.3)  (1.5)  (2.6)  (0.0)
NOB - 216;
*) critical value: 26.3 (5 percent level).
**)  For  the  definition  of  FS,  OP,  and  IFO  see  pages  9  and  12.
All three indicators for the degree of openness have again a coefficient
of  correct but insignificant sign.  FS and  OP are significant only at a 15  percent
level.  The Ifo-index is completely insignificant. This is probably due to the
fact that the expert knowledge on  which the index is based is outdated for the
sample under investigation. Market penetration turned out to be insignificant
in all three cases and the results are stable with respect to sample variations
(not shown).
The empirical  findings both  for FDI  stocks and  gross  outflows do not
support the hypothesis  that  the degree  of openness plays  a crucial role  in
attracting German FDI to a developing country. This outcome does, of course, not
suggest  that  a  restrictive  FDI  policy  is  harmless.  First  the  measurement
undertaken here is  very broad and averages out single components of FDI policy
that might be crucial. Second removing investment obstacles from the investment
regulations introduces more competition and has thus other  positive effects than
the  direct incremental one on  German FDI  investigated  here. Some  doubts, however,20
have to  be raised  about  the  gains  from  special  FDI incentives.  These imply  in
most  cases  subsidies  which  can  be quite  costly,  but nevertheless  the expected
amount  of FDI  will  not  be attracted.  If  host  countries  enter  into  an "incentive
competition"  among  themselves  they  will  eventually  all  offer  incentives  one  way
or the  other,  and  FDI  will increase  only as far  as a growth  effect  is  created.
Thus  these  rather  expensive  instruments  might  lose  their  effectiveness  for  single
countries.
Instead  of asking  the  developing  countries  to put up with foregone  tax
revenues  in  order  to  subsidize  private  companies  from  abroad  (which  will  at  least
in the  short  run lead to an increasing  need of other foreign  funds),  it might
be more  effective  to  support  the  foreign  direct  investor  in  the  source  country.
This issue,  however,  attracted  little  attention  in  the  past,  which  might  be due
to  the  fact  that  there  is  nothing  to  deregulate  in  most industrial  countries  as
there  are  no restrictions  to invest  abroad.  Promoting  investment  in developing
countries  is  rather  a  matter  of  subsidizing  projects.  The  actual  amount  of  funds
channelled  to  support  FDI  in  developing  countries  is  rather  low;  it  is  therefore
often  concluded  that their  effects  are  very small.  As will  be shown  below  this
conclusion  has to  be modified.
III.  The Effect  of the  German  Policy  Instruments  on FDI  outflows  to Developing
Countries
The design  of the  German  policy  instruments  to support  FDI in developing
countries  can be best understood  in keeping in mind the key features  of the
determinants:  German  FDI is  market-oriented  and  often  closely  linked  to  export
activity;  a lack of financial  resources  is in many cases not a constraint;
obstacles  are restrictiveness  of the host countries'  investment  regulations
including  tedious  approval  procedures  and  an assumed  risk  aversion.21
The  policy  instruments  are  generally  available  for  all  projects  in  all  developing
countries  as long as they fulfill  certain  standards,  i.e. they must have a
development  impact  and  be environmentally  acceptable.  Furthermore  they should
improve relations  between Germany and the host country.  Some programs are
specially  designed  to  activate  investment  from  small  and  medium  size  enterprises,
as their  complementary  effect  is considered  to be particularly  large.  On the
other  hand, the  motive  of investment  is not a criterion  for approval.  The set
of  promotional  instruments  contains  a  guarantee  scheme,  financial  support  (partly
in  form  of  subsidized  loans  extended  by  the  federal  government  and  partly  in  form
of market-oriented  equity and loan commitments  of a publicly  owned finance
institution)  and a whole  battery  of consultancy  services;  for  a review  of the
various  instruments see Gubitz (1990).
The following  analysis  describes  and  assesses  only  one  policy  instrument,
namely  the federal  guarantee  scheme,  which  is in  volume  terms  by far  the  most
important  promotion  measure.  Also a federal  guarantee  is an important  prere-
quisite  to obtain  public  support  from  other sources,  although  it is neither  a
necessary  nor a sufficient  condition.
III.1  The Federal  Guarantee  Scheme
As mentioned  in the  last  section  the  federal  government  tries  to  at least
partly overcome the  restrictive  attitude of  the developing countries by
establishing  bilateral  investment  treaties,  which  serve  as a legal  backing  for
the  private  investors.  For  a  private  investor  to  obtain  a  federal  guarantee  there
has to  be some legal  backing  of the  project  in  the  developing  country,  which  is22
assumed to  be automatically fulfilled if  a bilateral investment treaty exists.' 2
There are, however, countries which consider bilateral investment treaties as
inconsistent with their sovereignty, especially in Latin America; nevertheless
there are publicly guaranteed projects in these countries.
A federal guarantee  covers non-commercial risks only.  These are expropria-
tion or nationalization without compensation, default of a project as a course
of failure of the  host countries to  commit itself to  contractional duties related
to  the  project, destruction through  war, revolution  and other  conflicts, official
moratoria and certain convertibility risks.  The term  of a  guarantee is 15  years,
which can be extended every 5  years successively. 95  percent of the  project value
is covered and the remaining 5 percent are not allowed to  be covered elsewhere.
Earnings can be covered up to 50 percent of the  project value. The fees are very
low and cover part of  the administrative costs only. Also  the fees are not
differentiated with respect to different sectors, countries, types of risks or
capital versus earnings.  Applications are approved  by a board of representatives
from  the responsible ministries, who  meet every three months.  In case of a
default the compensation for the German investor is financed out of the federal
budget and the  claim on the  host country is transmitted to  the  German government.
Cases of default are, however, very rare. In 1988 they amounted to 1 percent of
the total value of guaranteed projects. The host governments often pay at least
part of the amount due after negotiating with the German authorities. If they
ultimately  default,  projects  in  their  countries  are  excluded  for  further
guarantees.
The federal guarantee scheme  started 1960.  Until the  end of 1988  about 2500
12Applications  for guarantees can only  be approved, if the  project has been
approved by the authorities of the host government.23
applications  with a total  value  of DM 9.3  billion  for  projects  in 91 countries
were approved (see Treuarbeit (1989)).  Only few applications  are finally
rejected.  The amount  of new approved  projects,  which  peaked  in 1988  at DM 0.6
billion,  is  strongly  influenced  by a  few  big  protjects.  According  to  the  Ministry
of Economic  Affairs  roughly  20  percent  of  German  FDI  in  developing  countries  is
covered  by a guarantee.
13
The  regional  pattern  of  guarantees  shows  a  much  heavier  weight  of African
and  Asian  countries  than  does the  general  regional  pattern  of German  FDI.  This
is related to three factors. First most bilateral investment  treaties  are
established  with  countries  of these  areas.  Second  guarantees  mostly  cover  equity
capital;  some  countries,  however,  rather  attract  FDI  related  loans  due  to  their
repatriation  practices, for example Brazil. Third the regional pattern is
affected  by the  age  structure  of  German  FDI;  in  Asia,  where  projects  on average
are much younger than for example in Latin America, the average size of a
guaranteed  project  is  markedly  higher  than  of those  in  other  regions.
13see von Wurzen (1989); it is not quite clear how  this number was
calculated.  Most likely  it relates  guarantee  approvals  to accumulated  net FDI
outflows.24
Table  III.1:  Regional  Pattern  of Federal  Guarantees
(percentage  shares)
number  of  value  of  total  stocks
Region  approved  projects  *)  **)
Africa  30.2  29.6  9.9
Latin  America  33.7  32.0  47.3
Asia  22.8  27.9  12.7
Europe  ***)  13.3  10.5  30.1
Total  100.0  100.0  100.0
Memo items:
Total  2557  9.3  29.2
(number/
DM  billions)
*) as end  of 1988.-  **)  as end  of 1987.-  ***) incl.  Spain.
Note:  Country  classification  might  deviate.
Sources:  Treuarbeit  (1989),  Deutsche  Bundesbank
The  German  guarantee  scheme  has  proven  not  to  be  quantitatively  restrictive
in the  past,  as no application  has  been turned  down  because  of  budget  limita-
tions.  As it is  at least  potentially  subsidized  by the  government,  although  the
actual  subsidy  might  be low,  it is only  justified,  if it  causes  additional  FDI
in  developing  countries.  In  the  following  analysis  it  will  be tested  wiether  the
amount  of federal  guarantees  had  a significantly  positive  effect  on German  FDI
outflows  to  developing  countries.
III.2  The  Effect  of Guarantees  on FDI  Qutflows
In  a  recent  study  on  the  determinants  of  German  FDI  in  developing  countries
it  was found  that  German  FDI inflows  to developing  countries  did not react  to
a  decrease  in the  rating  of a country's  creditworthiness,  whereas  FDI inflows
to  developing  countries  in general  were significantly  negatively  affected  (see25
Agarwal,  Gubitz  and  Nunnenkamp  (1990)).  As the  general  perception  of the  German
investment  community  is that  the  latter  is  particularly  risk  averse  this  result
was somewhat  u%nexpected.  The explanation  for this finding  is,  however,  rather
obvious  as a high share  of new investments  to developing  countries  is covered
by a guarantee.
In order  to investigate  this argument  in some more detail  a regression
equation  relating  gross  FDI  outflows  to  developing  countries  (FDM)  with  exchange
rates (EXDM),  nominal  GNP (GDM),  country  credit  rating (II)  and new approved
guarantees  relative  to GNP (GARNEW)  was  estimated  (general  notation  as  before;
data sources  see  Annex I).  As the  amount  of new approved  guarantees  increases
with country  risk, it is corrected  for this effect  by weighting  it with the
country's  credit  rating,  i.e.  the  higher  the  credit  worthiness  the  higher  the
weight  of the  actual  amount  of  new  approved  guarantees. 14 For  the  country  credit
rating  the  annual  average  of the  index  of the  Institutional  Investor  was  used,
i.e. a higher  country  risk is associated  with a lower  credit  rating.  Data on
approved  guarantees  was  available  for  17  countries  and  the  panel  covers  the  years
1980  to 1988.15
140n  the  other  hand,  one  could  argue  that  an increasing  country  risk (i.e.
a decreasing  II) is related  a higher  risk  premium  of expected  rates  of return
of the investment.  Thus the  potential  subsidy  on the  fee  charged  (which  is the
same  across  countries)  is  higher  and  a  greater  additionality  effect  is  therefore
associated  with guarantees  in countries  with a higher risk rating. In the
empirical  equation  this means that the elasticity  of new approved  guarantees
would  inversely  depend  on  II.  The  empirical  results,  however,  change  little  when
this  effect  is taken  into  account.
"These countries  are  Argentina,  Brazil,  Chile,  Colombia,  C6te d'Ivoire,
Egypt,  India,  Indonesia,  Korea  (South),  Malaysia,  Mexico,  Morocco,  Nigeria,  Peru,
Singapore,  Thailand,  and  Tunisia.  The II-index  is  not available  before  1980.26
(III.1) LFDM  O.61*LFDM(-l)  +  0.02*LEXDM  +  O.07*LGDM  O.16*LII  +  3.65*0P
(7.2)  (0.4)  (1.6)  (0.6)  (0.2)
+  0.06*LGARNEW,  RSQ  - 0.88,  NOB  153
(1.8)  CHISQ  - 47.8 (critical  value:  33.9)
The regression  result  confirms  earlier  findings  that an increase  in the
country  risk  measured  by its  credit  rating  does  not lower  gross  FDI inflows  in
the German case. An  increase  in approved  guarantees (relative to GNP and
corrected  for  the  risk  effect),  on  the  other  hand,  significantly  (at  a  10  percent
level)  increases  new  German  FDI  in  developing  countries.  The  degree  of  openness
of the  host  countries  turned  out  to  be insignificant.  An analogous  relationship
was also tested  for liquidations.  It turned  out that  a relatively  high amount
of publicly  guaranteed  FDI stock did not significantly  reduce  the amount  of
liquidations.  The overall  performance  of the  equation  explaining  liquidations
(not  shown)  was,  however,  so  poor  that  conclusions  could  not  really  be  drawn  from
it.
IV.  Summary  and  Conclusions
The  empirical  investigation  of  FDI  flows  to  developing  countries  has  proven
to  be rather  unsatisfactory  in  the  past.  To  a  major  extent  this  can  be  explained
by data problems.  Data is not easily  available  and only compiled  in nominal
terms; thus valuation  and volume effects  cannot  be properly separated.  The
problems  get  even  worse  when the  investigation  has to draw  on stock  data,  i.e.
book  values.  The above  analysis  however  showed  that  FDI  policies  matter.  While
it  has so far  been assumed  that  the  rules  and  regulations  of the  host countries
with  respect  to FDI  would  disguise  the  economic  fundamentals  driving  the  amount
and distribution  of FDI, the results  presented  above identified  a source
country's  policy instrument,  namely the public guarantees,  as an important27
determinant  of  FDI  outflows  to  developing  countries.  This  latter  aspect  has  been
overlooked  in the past. Developing  countries  might gain more foreign  direct
capital  inflows  by easing  investment  restrictions  or implementing  incentives,
but the  effect  is  possibly  modest  and  does  not  justify  costly  subsidies.  On the
other  hand the  industrial  countries  can  substantially  encourage  their  companies
to invest  in developing  countries  by offering  public  guarantees.  The case of
Germany  has shown  that  the  actual  costs  involved  are  very low,  as defaults  are
rare.  Thus  once it is  decided  that  public  support  should  be used  to direct  more
FDI  to  developing  countries,  source  countries'  policies  might  be more  effective





There  are two  main  data sources  for  FDI  in developing  countries:  (1)  the
IMF  Balance  of Payments  Statistics,  which  contains  transaction  data  as  reported
by the  host countries,  and (2)  the  OECD-DAC  statistics  which  reports  FDI  of the
OECD-DAC  member  states  in the  developing  countries,  i.e. it  is based  on source
countries' information.  The numbers for total inflows  of FDI in developing
countries  cited  here refer  to  the  IMF  Balance  of Payments  Statistic.  German  FDI
stock data  by country  and sector  is published  annually  as a supplement  ("Die
Kapitalverflechtung  der  U'nternehmen  mit  dem  Ausland  nach  LAndern  und  Wirtschafts-
zweigen")  to  the  "Beiheft  zu  den  Monatsbereichten  der  Deutschen  Bundesbank,  Reihe
3, Zahlungsbilanzstatistik".  FDI  gross  outflows  are  compiled  within  the  German
balance of payments statistics.  Data on FDI flows with respect to single
countries  is  generally  not  published,  but  was  kindly  made  available  to  the  author
for  a given  selection  of countries.
Explaining  Variables:
Exchange  rates  (EXDM)  are  calculated  as cross-rates  from  the  market  rates
in  local  currency  vis-a-vis  the  US-Dollar  as  published  in  the  IMF  International
Financial  Statistics.  In  the  stock  adjustment  equation  the  exchange  rates  refer
to the  end  of the  year,  in  the  flow  equation  they  refer  to  annual  averages.  Host
countries'  GNP is in  nominal  terms  ksource:  The  World  Bank - World  Tables)  and
converttd  to D-mark  (CDM).  Market  penetration  (EXAN)  is  German  nominal  exports
to  the  host country  (source:  IMF  Direction  of  Trade  Statistics)  relative  to  the29
host  country's  GNP.  Country  credit  rating  (II)  is  measured  by the  annual  average
of  the  semi-annual Institutional  Investor's index  (source: Institutional
Investor).  German  new  approved  public  guarantees  were  adjusted  for  risk  effects
by multiplying  with II  and  dividing  by the  host  country's  GNP.  The  total  amount
of public  guarantees  (source:  Treuarbeit,  unpublished)  for  projects  in single
countries  is  generally  confidential  data,  but  was  kindly  made available  to the
author  for  a given  selection  of countries.  The  variables  measuring  the  degree
of openness  with respect  to investment  rules  and regulations  are explained  in
the text.30
Annex II
FDI-Regulations,  Part  I
Entry  and  ownership  Access  to  Repatriation  of:
Host  J  restrictions  foreign
country  exchange  profLts  capital
Algeria  all investments  re-  up to 15  percent
quire  approval,  of capi-
joint  ventures  are  restricted  tal  orig-  granted
preferred  and  get  nally  in-
special  incentives  vested
Indonesia  all  investments  re-
quire  approval  and
need to be joint  free  granted
ventures,  excep-
tions,  liberaliza-
tions  in  1988,1989
Iran  ?  restricted  approval  needed
Libya  some  areas  closed,  after  approval,
usually  share  less  restricted  usually  granted
than  49 percent
Nigeria  40 enterprises
closed,  100  percent  owner-
ship  only in  new  restricted  approval  needed
FDI,  joint  ventures
in oil  sector  l
Venezuela  gas, iron  and  pet-  four-tier  granted,  but
roleum  sectors  exchange  special  rules  un-
closed,  usually  market,  der  debt/equity
share  less than  one  is  conversion  scheme
49%,  branches  of  free
foreign  companies
are  not  considered
foreign  investment
United  Arab  not  more than  49 %
Emirats  share  allowed,  free  granted
except  in  branches
Africa
Cote  d'Ivoire  "positive"  list,
special  status  for  restricted  granted
"priority"  enter-
prises31
Part  I continued
Egypt  inland  investments  can  be  after  5
need approval,  in  restricted  restrict-  years,
free  zones  no  ed  excep-
restrictions  tions
Kenya  approval  required,  restrict-  only  or-
Africanization  re-  restricted  ed to  ginal






Morocco  approval  required,
except  equity  in-  restricted  after  approval,
vestment  in new  exceptions,  e.g.
companies  and  sub-  in the  tourist  in-
scription  to capi-  dustry
tal  increase  in
existing  companies
Tunisia  no general  limits restricted  granted,  subject
to authorization
including  capital
gains  (fairly  new
legislation)
Asmerica
Argentina  no general  exclu-  since  restrict-
sion,  but  different  dual  mar-  1983  via ed under
degrees  of approval  ket,  one  $-denom.  emergency
required,  special  free  gov.  regula-
regulation  in the  bonds,  tions,
petroleum  sector,  profits after  10
important  easing  of  above  years  for
restrictions  in  12%  of  FDI  under
1989,  no approval  reg.  debt/
for  reinvestment  of  capital equity
profits  are  sub-  conver-
ject  to  sion  pro-
a spe-  gram
tax,  recent
earnings  easing  of





*) cannot  be remitted  for  4 years.32
Part I continued
Brazil  100%  ownership  12%  p.a. granted,
possible,  joint  restricted  over 3-  but long
venture  preferred,  year  delays
restrictive  Infor-  average occur












fied  in  specified
investm.
contract
Colombia  100%  ownership  pos- approved  not  more  under
sible,  to get  spe-  exchange  than 25%  specific
cial  benefits  less  license  of reg.  condi-
required  capital tions
Guatemala  approval  required,  prior  approval  re-
special  legislation  restricted  quired
in the  petroleum
sector
Mexico  ownership  usually  two  mar-  granted,  on the
restricted  to 49%,  kets,  one  free  market,  long
exceptions,  no au-  free  delays  occur
thorization  for in-
vestment  in in-bond
industries,  1989:
100%  ownerships
allowed  in  many
sectors
Peru  at least  15%  natio-  multi-tier  limited  ?
nal  participation, market,  to 20%,
exceptions,  special  one free  excep-
Mining  Law,  gradu-  tions
al increase  of nat.
participation,  ex-
ceptions
Q151=Ca8S---  --  --  - - - -------- =IQ  G:BDilQC>aOQQQ:a_1,t  11033
Part  I  continued
India  Reserve  Bank  per-  after  approval
mission  required,in  restricted  incl.
general  only  min-  capital
ority  shares,  "di-  gains,  in
lution"  formulas,  suitable
exceptions  in  install-
core and  export-  ments
oriented  sectors
Israel  free,  for  preferen-
tial treatment  ap-  restricted  granted
proval  required  i
Korea,  Rep.  "negative  list",  in restricted  granted
manufacturing  98%
open
Malaysia  after  approval,  in
export-oriented  free  gra  ted
sector  100%  share
possible,  also  in
other  sectors,  if
local  partner  can-
not  be found
Pakistan  after  approval,  restricted  granted
liberal  policy
Philippines  in general  minority  restricted  permitt-  depends
share,  except  in  ed,  if  on the
priority  sectors,  not fin-  source  of
(new  Investment  anced  on financing
Code in 1987)  domestic  special





Sri  Lanka  after  permission  in  free  for  granted
specifically  restricted  profits for  ap-









Part I  continued
Thailand  after  approval,  no  restricted  granted  for  ap-
general  ownership  proved  proJects
restrictions
Turkey  after  approval,  re-  restricted  granted after
quired  capital  must  approval
be imported,  excep-
tions  under  speci-
al laws  or when
funds  from  blocked
accounts  are  used35
FDI-Regulations:  Part  II
Bil.  Taxa-
Host  inv.  tion*)/
country  treaty  double Special  Performance  Approval
tax.  - incentives requirements  process
agreem.
Algeria  no  3/no  for  joint  replacement  ?
ventures  of foreign
staff  by
locals
Indonesia  yes  4/yes  tax incen- import  sub-  one-stop,
tives  stitution,  fairly
employment  bureau-
restrictions  cratic
Iran  yes  NA/yes  ?  ?  ?
Libya  no  1/no  under  ?
Petroleum
Law
Nigeria  no  3/no  tax  reliefs  ?  long  and
debt con-  complica-
version  ted,  but
program,  improved
privatiza-  in 1988
tion
Venezuela  no  1/no  debt/equity  local  con-  ?
conversion tent  re-
promoted  - quirements
special  tax
advantages
Unitec  Arab  no  NA/no
Emirates
Africa













Egypt  yes  3/yes  tax  reliefs  bureau-







Kenya  yes  3/yes  tax  reliefs Kenyaniza- very bu-
industry  tion  pro-  reaucra-











Tunesia  yes  3/yes  tax  exemp-  support-






Argentina  no  4/yes  Oct. 89:  special  unsteady
Equal  rules  for
treatment  profit  and
of for-  capital  re-
eign  and  patriation
domestic  for  FDI  made




Brazil  no  4/yes  high degree  non-secured  ?






Part II  continued
_ainma-m  --- c--n-c,-
Chile  no  3/no  equal  treatment  of for-  ?
eign  and  domestic  in-
vestments
I
Colombia  no  4/no  for  benefitting  from the  ?
Cartagena  Agreement  a
company  has to  become
51%  domestically  owned
after  thirty  years
Guatemala  no  3/no  ,  ?
Mexico  no  3/no  tax incen- Nat.  Comm.  very
tives  only  on Foreign  bureau-
for  compa- Investment  cratic,
nies  with  can  impose  attempt
minority  restrictions  to im-
foreign  on a discre-  prove
share,  spe-  tionary
cial incen-  basis,  Mexi-
tives  for  canization
in-bond  efforts
production
Peru  no  4/no  for  benefitting  from  ?
Cartagena  Agreement  a
company  has to  become
mixed  or national  after








India  yes  1/yes  no special  incentives  or  ?
disincentives
Israel  yes  4/yes  limited  ?
withholding
tax  of 25 percent
Korea,  Rep.  yes  4/yes  available,  fast
tax  privi-  approval,
leges  re-  sometimes
duced  in  automatic
198738
Part  II  continued






Pakistan  yes  2/yes  liberal
policy






Sri  Lanka  yes  2/yes  ?








Thailand  yes  4/yes  incentives  as  well as  ?
performance  requirements
are  geared  to the  pro-
iect  I
Turkey  yes  2/yes no special  regulation  ?
for  foreign  investors,
tax  reliefs  limitation
customs  ex-  on the  em-
emptions  ployment  of
can  be  foreigners
granted
*) Scores  ranging  from  1 (worst)  to  5 (best);  source:  Frost  & Sullivan,  1988.  -
NA:-  not available.
Sources:  IMF,  UNCTC,  U.S.  Department  of  Commerce,  Frost  &  Sullivan,  Inc.  (1988),
Bescky,Lee  and  Ordu (1989),  Pfeffermann  (1988),  Scharrer  and  Kragenau  (1988)39
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